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Abstract 
The objective of this study is to investigate whether remittances in Macedonia affect poverty and 
inequality. Using two household surveys, one conducted in 2008, one in 2012, we find that 
remittances reduce both poverty and inequality. The inequality-reducing effect has been particularly 
present in 2012.  
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1. Introduction 
 
International migration is one of the most important factors that affect economic relations 
between developed and developing countries in the 21st century. At the start of the century, it 
was estimated that about 175 million people, roughly 3% of the world population, lived and 
worked outside the country of their birth (United Nations, 2002). The international 
remittances sent back home by these migrant workers have a profound impact on the 
developing countries of Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. 
Remittances that these workers send back to developing countries rose from $31.1 billion in 
1990, to $76.8 billion in 2000 to around $400 billion in 2012. These flows are expected to 
rise 8% in 2013 and 10% in 2014 to reach $534 billion in 2015 (World Bank, 2012). They 
amount to over twice the amount of the official development assistance and are 10 times 
higher than the net private capital transfers to developing countries (Kapur and McHale, 
2003). Constituting one of the largest sources of foreign exchange earnings (in some 
countries even exceeding export revenues and foreign direct investment), remittances become 
a relatively attractive source of foreign earning for developing countries. 
Things are not much different in Macedonia. Since 2004, remittances in Macedonia have 
averaged 250 million euros per annum (around 4% of GDP), roughly the same as flows from 
foreign direct investment. Furthermore, their upward trend has been maintained despite the 
recent crisis – in 2008, before the crisis, they were 280 million euros, while in 2012, after the 
crisis, they reached 310 million euros.  
Given the nature, magnitude, and evolution of these flows it should not be a surprise that 
remittances are now seen by development practitioners as having a potentially important role 
to play in supporting the development efforts of recipient countries. There are two main 
channels in which remittances can support these efforts. First, remittances could flow towards 
the neediest groups of the population and therefore directly contribute to poverty reduction. 
Second, with imperfect insurance and financial markets, remittances can also contribute to 
higher investment in human and physical capital. For example, these flows can remove some 
of the financial constraints faced by households and small-scale entrepreneurs that prevented 
them from investing. Thus in this regard, remittances may also potentially contribute to 
raising the country’s long run growth potential through higher rates of capital accumulation. 
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There are a lot of papers that investigated the issue and determinants of remittances, since 
they represent one of the most stable external sources of financing for developing countries.  
At first, researchers were focused on remittances and their direct economic consequences, 
like economic growth, investment, poverty and income inequality, but lately there have also 
come out a lot of papers where the non-pecuniary consequences of remittances, such as their 
impact on health, education, care arrangements and social structures and ethnic hierarchies 
are examined. According to Pant (2008), whether remittances are utilized for consumption or 
purchasing houses, or for investment in other things, they have positive impact on the 
economy by stimulating demand for other goods and services. Migrants send different forms 
of capital that have developmental impact in their origin countries. These impacts may be in 
the form of financial, social, political, cultural or economic impact. The impact can be 
examined at both micro level, like in case of households and macro level like impact on GDP 
growth, poverty and development. 
This study will investigate remittances’ impact on social disparities in the Western Balkans, 
more precisely, in Macedonia. It will investigate the role of remittances for poverty and 
income inequality. Special emphasis will be put on the Great Recession, and how these 
relationships have changed with it. The analysis will be done using two household surveys, 
one conducted in 2008, one in 2012. Findings point out that remittances decrease both 
poverty and inequality in Macedonia. The inequality-reducing role has been particularly 
evident during the post-crisis period.  
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 makes an overview of the literature on this 
topic. Section 3 presents descriptive analysis. Section 4 portrays the methodology to be used. 
Section 5 gives the results and offers discussion and the last section concludes and offers 
policy recommendations. 
 
2. Literature overview 
As for the most economic issues, there is no consensus in the literature about remittances’ influence 
on poverty reduction and income inequality, neither that they are an engine of long-run growth. There 
are two contrasting views regarding the effects of international remittances on the economy of the 
labor-sending country: the optimistic view and the pessimistic view. The first one views remittances 
as mechanisms for economic development while the latter, on the other hand, perceives remittances as 
an “illness” that weakens the economy. 
3 
 
Remittances have important contribution to human welfare: this aid flows directly to the people who 
really need it and it does not require a costly bureaucracy on the sending side and “far less of it is 
likely to be siphoned off into the pockets of corrupt government officials” (Kapur, 2003). Although 
most international remittances do not flow directly to the poorest people, remittances often make up 
an important share of the income of poor people and poor communities. Moreover, non-migrant poor 
might be affected indirectly (positively or negatively) through the economy-wide effects of remittance 
expenditure on wages, prices and employment. In accordance with the importance of the official 
international remittances, relatively rich literature exists on their effects on poverty alleviation in 
developing countries. Some more recent contributions include: Adams and Page (2005); Spatafora 
(2005); Munzele (2005); Banga and Sahu (2010); Acosta et al. (2007; 2008); Jongwanish (2007); 
Javid et al. (2012); Siddiqui and Kemal (2006; Nwosu (2009); Adams and Cuecuecha (2008), and all 
document remittances as significantly reducing the level, depth and severity of poverty, i.e. 
international migration of labor has substantial potential benefits for poor people. 
The remittances of money and goods by migrants to their origin countries can also have important 
impacts on the distribution of household income and welfare. This is especially the case in developing 
economies, where household earnings are low, inequality is often pervasive and domestic or 
international migration of family members can provide a major source of income through the 
remittances of wage earnings. Literature has been rich in investigating this topic also. For instance, 
Mckenzie and Rapoport (2004) argue that when migration to a new destination starts taking place, the 
cost of emigrating is usually high; implying that, in the presence of liquidity constraints, only high-
income members of population can afford the move. At the beginning, when only richer and more 
educated people migrate to another country, income inequality actually rises. But, as the number of 
migrants in that destination increases, the cost of emigration declines, giving individuals in low-
income households the opportunity to emigrate. This is because emigration costs include not only 
transportation and borders-crossing costs, but information costs about the specific destination to 
choose, the search for a job, shelter and so on. Such information costs are significant and tend to 
decrease as the size of a network of migrants augments. As a result, over time remittances should 
accrue to low-income households, thereby reducing income inequality at the origin. The empirical 
literature – e.g. Anyanwu (2011); Kimhi (2010); Adams (1991); Ebeke and Le Goff (2009)  – found 
mixed results, though, suggesting that remittances’ effect on inequality is far from being uniform 
and usually dependent on factors as the level of country’s development; skill endowment of 
population and potential migrants, existence of information and emigration networks and so on. 
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3. Stylized facts 
Remittance flows represent an important income for households in Macedonia and important source 
of financing the current account deficit - since 2004 they have averaged 4% of GDP, roughly the same 
as flows from foreign direct investment. Their upward trend has been maintained despite the recent 
crisis – in 2008, before the crisis, they amounted to 277 million euro, while in 2012, after the crisis, 
they are estimated to be 294 million euro (World Bank data)2. 
The empirical analysis in this paper will be done on two household (HH) surveys. The first has been 
collected for the project “Development on the Move: Measuring and Optimizing the Economic and 
Social Impacts of Migration in the Republic of Macedonia”, by Educon Research, Macedonia. This 
survey has been collected in July-September 2008 and covers 1211 households. The primary focus on 
this survey (and project) is to analyze migration, so there are questions about remittances. For more 
details, see Educon Research (2009). The second survey has been collected for this project. It has 
been designed by the authors of this study, following the UNDP Kosovo Remittances Survey 2010, 
and has been collected by GfK Macedonia on a total of 1000 household (800 nationally representative 
households and 200 remittances receiving households), during October and November 2012. 
The data on remittances available from the two household surveys, mainly coincide with the official 
macro data, as can be seen in Table 1. However, households tend to underreport the amount of 
remittances received – in 2008 the estimates from the available household survey were around 60% of 
the official macro figures, while in 2012 they were about 80%. Still, the upward trend in the 
remittances is evident in the micro data too. Looking at them in greater detail, one can observe that 
the increase in total remittances comes mainly from the extensive margin, i.e. from the increased 
number of households that get remittances – before the crisis, in 2008, around 16% of the households 
reported receiving remittances, whereas in 2012, after the crisis, the percentage increased to 21%. At 
the same time, the average amount of remittances per household remained increased marginally, from 
1990 to 2070 euro per receiving household, per year.  
 
Table 1 – Some facts about the remittance flows in 2008 and 2012*  
  Average amount of 
remittances per 
receiving household 
(euro) 
Percentage of 
households 
receiving 
remittances (%) 
Estimated amount 
of total 
remittances (mil. 
euro) 
World Bank 
data on total 
remittances 
(mil. euro) 
Pre-crisis 1992 15.7                  167.5    276.9 
Post-crisis 2068 20.7                  230.6       293.9 
Source: DoTM Survey (2008); UACS Remittances Survey (2012). 
2 All the nominal amounts (on remittances, consumption etc.) in this section are expressed in 2008 prices, i.e. the data for 
2012 have been deflated for the cumulative inflation between 2009 and 2012 (7.4%), for better comparison between the two 
time periods. 
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 The share of HHs with migrant member remained roughly the same in the two surveys (Table 2). 
While nearly half of the households in 2008 reported absent migrant who does not send money, this 
number halved in 2012, suggesting that amid the crisis, households in Macedonia likely strengthened 
the utilization of the diaspora for income support. Finally, both before and after the crisis, nearly all 
absent migrant were close family to the responding household. 
Table 2 – Households with absent migrant 
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 1211 190 15.7% 28.2% 44.4% 97.4% 
After the crisis 
 801 166 20.7% 27.2% 23.9% 100% 
Source: DoTM Survey (2008); UACS Remittances Survey (2012). 
 
Some additional facts about the two surveys are shown in Table 3 in order to build further intuition 
about the changes between the two time periods. The share of poor households has decreased 
substantially, from 26% in 2008, to 18% in 2012, which can be ascribed, apart from the increase in 
remittances, to the measures undertaken in the period between, which may have positively affected 
the poor, like the agricultural subsidies program, the increase in the public-sector wages and pensions, 
and the measures for fighting the informal economy (the reduction of taxes and social contributions 
and introduction of flat tax system). At the same time, the share of households with self-employed 
members declined, from 16% in 2008, to 9% in 2012, which comes at a surprise, given the 
government efforts to improve the business climate, but may be explained by the global crisis. 
Finally, it can be observed that the remittance flows have much higher standard deviation in 
2008 than in 2012 (5464 vs. 2310), which points out that remittances have been more unequally 
dispersed before the crisis, and have become more equally distributed after the crisis. In other words, 
after the crisis, remittances might have started to decrease inequality. 
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Table 3 – Some additional statistics from the two available surveys 
  HHs Female 
headed 
Poor Albanian Rural Urban Skopje Self 
employed 
St. dev. of 
remit. 
Pre-crisis 1211 42.6% 25.7% 26.9% 26.1% 50.5% 23.5% 15.9% 5464 
Post-crisis 800* 19.5% 17.9% 26.1% 43.1% 37.7% 19.2% 9.2% 2310 
*800 households in the representative sample, plus 200 in the booster sample 
Source: DoTM Survey (2008); UACS Remittances Survey (2012). 
 
Table 4 looks at the poverty rates before and after the crisis for receivng and non-receiving HHs. 
Interesting conclusions emerge. First, no large differences existed in poverty rates before the crisis, 
depending on whether households were remittances’ receivers or not. However, after the crisis, 
remittance-receiving households exhibit larger improvement in poverty, which is in line with the 
finding that larger number of households was remittance receiver after the crisis than compared to 
before the crisis.  
Table 2. – Poverty among surveyed households by different characteristics 
 All Remittances’ 
receivers 
Non-
remittances’ 
receivers 
Before the crisis 
 25.7% 25.3% 25.8% 
After the crisis 
 17.9% 13.3% 19.1% 
 
Source: DoTM Survey (2008); UACS Remittances Survey (2012). 
 
Table 5 shows some patterns in remittances for different groups in the Macedonian society, before 
and after the crisis. It can be observed that female-headed households, on average get more 
remittances than male-headed. However, this difference was especially pronounced before the crisis. 
After the crisis, female-headed households continued to receive roughly the same amount of 
remittances than before the crisis (464 vs. 437 euro), while remittances for male-headed households 
increased substantially (to 420 from 220 euro). This may happen if the increase in remittances was 
due to children starting working abroad, instead of the households’ heads. Another interesting fact is 
that Albanian households get much higher remittances than Macedonian households, both before and 
after the crisis. Moreover, remittance flows increased during the crisis for Albanians (to 886 from 440 
euro), while they remained unchanged for Macedonians (267 vs. 265). Similar trends are observed in 
the incidence of remittances, which is higher for Albanian households than for Macedonian ones, 
especially for the period after the crisis; the share of Albanian households receiving remittances 
increased during the crisis (to 42%, from 18%), while the share of Macedonian declined (to 14%, 
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from 16%). It seems that the crisis hit differently Albanian and Macedonian remitters, which may be 
explained by the fact that Albanian migrants are located in countries which coped relatively well 
during the crisis (like Switzerland), while most of the Macedonian remitters work in EU countries 
who have suffered more during the crisis, like Italy.  
Table 3. - Some patterns in remittances across different groups, before and after the crisis 
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Pre-crisis 
Average 
consumption 
(euro)  
3550 3537 3567 1031 4420 4464 3213 4543 2973 3687 
Average 
remittances 
(euro) 
313 220 437 338 304 440 265 361 356 164 
% of remittance 
in consumption 
(for HHs 
receiving remit.) 
14.6% 6.9% 25.0% 39.3% 7.0% 29.6% 8.9% 8.0% 22.7% 5.1% 
Share of 
households 
getting 
remittances (%) 
15.7% 13.8% 19.2% 17.2% 15.8% 17.5% 15.6% 17.8% 17.5% 11.4% 
Post-crisis 
Average 
consumption 
(euro)  
4946 5101 4302 1631 5678 4105 5242 4661 4967 5541 
Average 
remittances 
(euro) 
429 420 464 269 464 886 267 481 420 328 
% of remittance 
in consumption 
(for HHs 
receiving remit.) 
11.2% 10.7% 13.4% 15.7% 10.2% 24.6% 6.5% 12.2% 11.1% 9.2% 
Share of 
households 
getting 
remittances (%) 
20.7% 20.7% 21.2% 15.6% 22.0% 41.7% 13.5% 26.3% 15.9% 19.7% 
 Source: DoTM Survey (2008); UACS Remittances Survey (2012). 
 
Table 6 shows some statistics on remittances for households with different economic welfare, i.e. 
households belonging to different consumption groups3. It can be observed that households belonging 
3 We will use consumption as a measure if welfare, for two reasons. First, consumption is much less volatile category than 
the income, which can be contaminated by various shocks when observed at one point in time. For example, a person which 
is in good economic situation, but is temporarily without a job, will have zero income, which would lead to wrong 
conclusions about his/her economic situation. If his/her welfare is measured through the consumption, though, a more 
reliable picture will be obtained, since his/her consumption will not be zero. Second, in the former available survey, for 
2008, the data on income is incomplete, since there are data on income from earnings only, not from other sources, such as 
pensions and social benefits. 
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to the lower consumption quartiles, i.e. poorer households, received lower amounts of remittances, in 
absolute terms, both before and after the crisis, which supports the observation from above that 
remittances might have increased inequality, instead of decreasing it. The finding that poorer 
households receive less remittances than richer is not surprising, because poorer households are less 
likely to migrate, due to the costs of migration which they cannot afford. In addition, even if they 
migrate, poorer households usually are less educated, because of what are likely to earn less and to 
send less money back home.  
Table 4. – Remittances by different consumption groups 
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Pre-
crisis 
1st 1016 338 234.4 39.8 17.0 
2nd 2136 121 45.4 6.0 13.2 
3rd 3383 360 66.8 9.9 14.9 
4th 7664 431 28.3 5.4 19.1 
 
Post-
crisis 
1st 1903 287 83.2 14.8 17.9 
2nd 3411 386 42.7 11.3 26.5 
3rd 4849 612 58.3 12.9 22.1 
4th 9691 426 35.4 5.8 16.2 
Source: DoTM Survey (2008); UACS Remittances Survey (2012). 
 
Looking at the income from remittances relative to households’ consumption, for different groups, it 
can be observed that the share of remittances in consumption was much higher for the households 
from the first quartile than for the other households, before and after the crisis, which points out that 
remittances play important role in satisfying consumption needs for poorer households and might 
alleviate poverty.  
Comparing the situation before the crisis vs. the situation after the crisis, it can be observed that only 
the lowest-quartile households recorded a drop in the amount of remittances received in 2012 relative 
to 2008 (from 338 euro to 287). This points out that the crisis has affected the poorest most severely. 
This is confirmed by the dynamics in remittances for households below and above the poverty line 
between the two time periods (Table 7). One indeed gets the impression that the crisis has affected the 
poor most adversely – the share of poor households that receive remittances has fallen after the crisis 
(to 14.9%, from 16.8%), while the share of non-poor households that get remittances has increased (to 
22%, from 15.8%). Similarly, the average amount of remittances for the poor households has fallen 
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substantially (from 338 to 269 euro), while it has increased for the non-poor households (from 304 to 
464 euro). 
Table 5. – Remittances for poor and non-poor households 
 Quartile Average 
Consumption 
(euro) 
Average 
remittances 
(euro) 
% of 
remittance in 
consumption 
(for HHs 
receiving 
remit.) 
% of 
remittance in 
consumption 
(for all HHs) 
Share of 
households 
getting 
remittances 
(%) 
Pre-
crisis 
Poor 1031 338 233.0 39.3 16.8 
Non Poor 4420 304 44.3 7.0 15.8 
Post-
crisis 
Poor 1631 269 105.2 15.7 14.9 
Non Poor 5678 464 46.7 10.2 22.0 
Source: DoTM Survey (2008); UACS Remittances Survey (2012). 
Finally, Table 8 portrays the usage of remittances inflows. The crisis likely led to households increase 
the usage of remittances for consumption, but also for property purchase and savings, at the expense 
of longer-term ventures, like education, health-related spending, starting-up a business and 
agricultural land purchase. However, the increase in consumption has been more prominent for the 
non-poor. The usage of remittances for starting up a business likely suffered most throughout all sub-
groupings amid the crisis. 
10 
 
Table 8. – Usage of remittances 
  Consumption of 
the household 
(good, clothes, 
home 
equipment, car) 
Family 
events 
Property 
investment 
(excpt. agr. 
land) 
Education Health Starting 
up a 
business 
Agricultural 
land 
investment 
Savings Debt 
repayment 
Lending 
Before the crisis 
All 40.2% 9.8% 6.1% 11.0% 11.0% 7.3% 4.9% 6.1% 3.7% 0.0% 
 Male-headed 35.7% 14.3% 4.8% 7.1% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 4.8% 4.8% 0.0% 
Female-headed 45.0% 5.0% 7.5% 15.0% 12.5% 5.0% 0.0% 7.5% 2.5% 0.0% 
 Macedonian 38.7% 8.1% 8.1% 8.1% 9.7% 8.1% 6.5% 8.1% 4.8% 0.0% 
Albanian 45.0% 15.0% 0.0% 20.0% 15.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Poor 47.6% 4.8% 4.8% 23.8% 9.5% 0.0% 4.8% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Non-poor 37.7% 11.5% 6.6% 6.6% 11.5% 9.8% 4.9% 6.6% 4.9% 0.0% 
 Skopje 38.0% 10.0% 6.0% 8.0% 12.0% 8.0% 8.0% 6.0% 4.0% 0.0% 
Urban (other than capital) 41.9% 9.7% 6.5% 16.1% 9.7% 6.5% 0.0% 6.5% 3.2% 0.0% 
Rural 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
After the crisis 
All 47.9% 5.0% 15.8% 6.4% 8.3% 0.7% 0.3% 10.1% 4.5% 1.1% 
 Male-headed 50.1% 4.2% 16.9% 5.0% 7.3% 0.7% 0.5% 10.2% 3.9% 1.1% 
Female-headed 43.2% 6.8% 13.2% 9.3% 10.4% 0.7% 0.0% 9.6% 5.7% 1.1% 
 Macedonian 44.6% 4.6% 15.8% 6.1% 6.9% 1.0% 0.2% 15.8% 4.4% 0.6% 
Albanian 52.0% 5.5% 15.8% 6.8% 10.0% 0.3% 0.5% 3.0% 4.5% 1.8% 
 Poor 49.6% 2.5% 11.8% 7.6% 9.2% 0.8% 1.7% 11.8% 4.2% 0.8% 
Non-poor 47.7% 5.4% 16.4% 6.2% 8.1% 0.6% 0.1% 9.8% 4.5% 1.2% 
 Skopje 49.5% 6.6% 14.6% 7.0% 7.7% 0.3% 0.7% 6.3% 5.6% 1.7% 
Urban (other than capital) 45.7% 3.5% 16.6% 6.4% 8.1% 1.0% 0.2% 13.5% 3.7% 1.0% 
Rural 52.8% 7.1% 15.0% 4.7% 10.2% 0.0% 0.0% 5.5% 4.7% 0.0% 
Source: DoTM Survey (2008); UACS Remittances Survey (2012). 
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4. Methodology and data 
4.1. Models 
The model used in the poverty analysis is very similar to the one from World Bank and Statistical 
Office of Kosovo (2011). Broadly speaking, it is in accordance with the other existing studies on this 
issue surveyed in section 2. The main regression is as follows:  
Pr(Poor) = c1 + c2*gender_head + c3*age_head + c4*age_head_squared 
+c5*married + c6*education_head + c7*size_HH + c8*size_HH_squared + 
c9*dependency_ratio + c10*main_income +c11*no_income + c12*albanian 
+c13*geography +c14*own_house +c15*remittances + c16*dummy2012 + u 
          (1) 
The dependent variable is poverty, i.e. the probability of being poor - a dummy variable taking a 
unitary value if a household had a consumption per capita below the 60th percentile of the median of 
the consumption per capita in that year. The explanatory variables are standard in the literature: 
gender of the head, age of the head, age squared, marriage status of the head, education of the nead, 
size of the household, size squared, the dependency ratio, main income in the household, ethnicity, 
urban/rural, whether household owns a house, the amount of remittances received and a dummy 
variable for the time/crisis effect. The coefficient on the remittances variable will tell us if remittances 
affect poverty or not. Also, a cross product between the remittances and the dummy for the crisis 
period will be included in order to see if the effect of the remittances on poverty changes with the 
crisis. Differently from other studies, we decide to include the amount of remittances received, and 
not a dummy variable for receiving remittances. The main reason for this is that we believe that there 
is a difference in the effect on poverty if a household receives 500 euros of remittances and if it 
receives 50.000 euros. 
Because there might be endogeneity in the relationship poverty-remittances, i.e. because poverty (the 
dependent variable) may also affect whether a household receives remittances and the amount it 
receives, we will use an instrumental variable technique to estimate equation 1. The variable that 
should instrument remittances should satisfy two properties: 1) it should be correlated with the 
variable it instruments (i.e. remittances); 2) it should not be correlated with the dependent variable in 
the main regresssion (i.e. probability of being poor) through channels other from the variable it 
insruments (i.e. remittances). Our instrument will be a dummy variable for migrating for 
completely non-economic reasons (political, education, marriage, war, discrimination etc.). Our both 
surveys have questions for the reasons for migrating. The questions are multiple-answer. We take 
only those cases which reported migrating for studying, marriage, political reasons etc., but not for 
economic reasons. Hence, our variable is likely to be uncorrelated with the incidence of poverty, i.e. 
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the second criterion from above should be satisfied4. It should also satisfy the first criterion, because 
migrants who left for purely non-economic reasons should also send money back home.  
The impact of remittances on income inequality will be measured through a comparison between the 
Gini coefficient of the actual household consumption and the Gini coefficient of the consumption that 
would prevail if there were no remittances.  
The simulation of the household consumption without the remittances is done following the 
existing literature (Acosta et al. 2007, 2008, Adams 1991, Adams and Cuecuecha 2008, 
Barham and Boucher 1998). First, household consumption per capita for households without 
remittances is regressed on a set of conventional explanatory variables: 
Consumption p/c = c1 + c2*gender_head + c3*age_head + c4*age_head_squared 
+c5*married + c6*education_head + c7*size_HH + c8*size_HH_squared + 
c9*dependency_ratio + c10*main_income +c11*no_income + c12*albanian + 
c13*geography +c14*own_house +c15*self_employment + c16*dummy2012 + 
c17*lambda + u        (2) 
Because the sample of non-remittances-receiving households might be non random, the 
model is corrected for the selection bias, following Heckman (1979), by including a variable 
measuring the probability for not receiving remittances (lambda). Lambda is actually the 
inverse Mills ratio from the following regression: 
Pr(no_remittances) = c1 + c2*gender_head + c3*age_head + c4*age_head_squared 
+ c5*married + c6*education_head + c7*size_HH + c8*size_HH_squared + 
c9*dependency_ratio + c10*main_income +c11*no_income + c12*albanian + 
c13*geography +c14*own_house + c15*self_employment + c16*dummy2012 + 
c17*remittances_region + u       (3) 
The last variable in this regression, remittances_region, is required to satisfy the exclusion 
restriction – in order the model to be identified, the first step regression needs to include a 
variable which does not affect the consumption directly, but affects the probability to receive 
remittances. Following Acosta et al. (2008), we take the share of households that receive 
remittances in every region as the exogenous variable. This share is likely to affect the 
4 It is true that the non-economic reasons for migration might be correlated with the economic background (i.e. poorer 
persons may be more likely to get married abroad). However, those cases are also likely to cite economic reasons for 
migration, besides the non-economic. By taking only those observations who cite only non-economic reasons, we believe we 
exclude these cases. 
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probability to receive remittances, through network effects. On the other hand, it is not very 
likely to affect the consumption directly.  
This consumption regression is then used to predict the consumption that remittances-
receiving households would have had they not received remittances. The predicted values 
from the model would have very low variance, because they exlude all the random factors 
that affect household consumption. Hence, to make them comparable to the original 
consumption data, we would add to them a random component, which would be a series 
drawn from a normal distribution with a mean and a standard deviation as the residuals from 
the consumption regression.  
Then the Gini coefficient of the actual consumption and the simulated one will be compared. 
Higher Gini of the simulated series would suggest that remittances decrease inequality. 
 
4.2. Survey setting 
Two household surveys are available for Macedonia. The first has been collected for the project 
“Development on the Move: Measuring and Optimizing the Economic and Social Impacts of 
Migration in the Republic of Macedonia”, by Educon Research, Macedonia. This survey has been 
collected in July-September 2008 and covers 1211 households. The primary focus on this survey (and 
project) is to analyze migration, so there are questions about remittances. For more details, see 
Educon Research (2009). The second survey has been collected for this project. It has been designed 
by the authors of this study, following the UNDP Kosovo Remittances Survey 2010, and has been 
collected by GfK Macedonia on a total of 1000 household (800 nationally representative households 
and 200 remittances receiving households), during October and November 2012.  
The first step in the preparation of the surveys is to define their structure. This is very important, 
because failure to account for the correct survey design can lead to wrong inference. The 
representative 800 households of the 2012 survey are stratified on two levels – region5 and 
rural/urban. On the first level of stratification, each region is included in the survey with a number of 
households proportional to the total number of households in that region. Then, on the second level of 
stratification, the number of rural and urban households from each region is proportional to the total 
number of rural/urban households in that region. Then, after the number of rural and urban households 
for each region has been determined in this way, those households are selected randomly. For the 
booster sample, 25 remittance-receiving households from each region have been selected and in the 
5 There are 8 regions in Macedonia – Skopje, Vardar Valley, Pelagonija, Polog, South-West, North-East, East and South-
East. 
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survey design they were assigned a probability proportional to the number of remittance-receiving 
households in each region without reference to urban-rural characteristic. Because the exact design of 
the 2008 survey was not known, it was assumed that it is same as the representative part of the 2012 
survey. Then, on the grounds of this information, the probability of being selected was calculated for 
each household from the two surveys, and these probabilities were used to correct the regression 
estimates.6 
4.3. Method and data 
The poverty and self-employment regressions will be estimated using the logit model, since the 
dependent variable is binary. The reported results are the marginal effects when the variables are on 
their mean values (for instance, how much the probability of being poor increases when age of the 
household head increases from the mean value of 47 to 48). 
The first-step regression in the simulation exercise (equation 5) will be estimated using probit. The 
second-step regression (equation 4) will be estimated using OLS. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis is shown in Tables 9 and 10. 
Table 9 shows the standard statistics of interest for the continuous variables, while Table 10 shows the 
percentage of observations with the respective attribute for the qualitative variables. 
 
Table 9. – Descriptive statistics of the quantitative variables used in the analysis 
 Absolute 
income 
inequality 
Age of 
head 
(years) 
Size of 
household 
(no. of 
members) 
Dependency 
ratio 
Remittances 
(EUR) 
Consumption 
per capita 
(EUR) 
Mean -1.8 47.1 3.5 0.6 516.6 1342.6 
Maximum 0.9 93.0 12.0 1.0 30952.4 17668.4 
Minimum -2978.2 17.0 1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.3 
St. Dev. 67.4 14.7 1.4 0.3 1771.8 1233.6 
25th perc. -0.6 35.0 3.0 0.5 0.0 636.6 
75th perc. 0.4 58.0 4.0 0.8 136.1 1598.0 
No. Obs. 1952.0 1986.0 1986.0 1986.0 1986.0 1952.0 
Source: Authors’ estimations 
 
 
6 This was done using the command “svyset” in Stata. 
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Table 10. - Descriptive statistics of the qualitative variables used in the analysis 
Attribute % of HH 
with the 
attribute 
Poor 21.5 
Self emp1oyment 12.6 
Male head 73.1 
Married head 79.5 
Education of head, secondary 29.6 
Education of head, university 12.0 
Education of head, postgraduate 0.4 
Main income from pensions 9.8 
Main income from social benefits 1.7 
Main income from other sources 1.4 
No income 14.7 
Albanian 27.0 
Urban 47.8 
Capital 18.1 
Own house 95.6 
Source: Authors’ estimations 
 
5. Econometric analysis and discussion 
5.1 Remittances and poverty 
Table 11 presents the results of the poverty analysis. The first two columns present the baseline 
results, while the next three columns – the results of the analysis of the effects of the crisis. The first 
column of the baseline results and the first two columns of the crisis results present the first-step 
regressions, i.e. the regression where the endogenous explanatory variables (the remittances) are 
regressed on the instruments (the dummy for non-economic migration)7. The most important results 
of the first-stage regressions are those regarding the strenght of the instruments. It can be seen that the 
dummies for non-economic migration (dum_no_econ and dum_no_econ*dum2012) are significant, 
pointing out that the instrument is unlikely to be weak. To be fair, the F values in the first-stage 
regressions are below the rule-of-thumb value of 10, but are above 2, so we proceed as if the 
instruments are not weak.  
The results of the baseline second-stage regression is shown in the second column. In general, results 
have the expected signs and some of them are statistically significant. They suggest that only those 
heads who have university education have lower probability of falling into poverty by about 17% than 
7 There are two first-stage regressions in the ‘crisis’ analysis, one for the remittances, the other one for the cross-product of 
the remittances with the dummy for 2012. 
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compared to heads with primary education, which justifies the investment in tertiary education, while 
the other educational degrees are found not to matter for poverty. The age and marriage are also 
unimportant for poverty. Each additional member of the household increases the probability of being 
poor by 7% suggesting that larger households are, on average, poorer than smaller ones. Also, those 
households which have higher number of dependent members (children and elderly) have higher 
probability of falling into poverty.  
With respect to income, we find that it does not matter for poverty what is the source of the main 
income of the household. Owning a house is not important for poverty, which may be explained by 
the high home-ownership rate in Macedonia (around 95%). The probability of being poor is the same 
for Albanians and Macedonians and for urban (other than capital) and rural inhabitants, as the 
respective coefficients are insignificant. On the other hand, those living in Skopje, the capital city, 
have lower probability of being poor by about 7% than rural counterparts, which is not surprising, 
given the role of Skopje as administrative and financial center of the country. Gender does not matter, 
either, as well as the crisis, which points out that the fall in the poverty between the two years is 
explained by the change in the other variables that are included in the regression.  
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Table 11: Results of the regression 
 
Baseline regression Crisis 
 1st step 2nd step 1st step 1st step 2nd step 
 
remit poor remit remit* poor 
       dum2012   
Age of the head (years) -38.03 -0.0078 -36.88 0.201 -0.0071 
 -34.37 -0.00816 -34.25 -11.53 -0.0279 
Age of the head, squared 0.356 7.61E-05 0.344 -0.0865 6.27E-05 
 
-0.398 -8.24E-05 -0.397 -0.109 -0.00033 
Married head 289.7*** 0.0447 289.9*** 202.9*** 0.0547 
 
-94.75 -0.0541 -94.36 -59.77 -0.0703 
Secondary education of head -58.01 -0.0307 -64.32 -29.27 -0.0318 
 
-101.4 -0.0433 -101.8 -44.24 -0.0501 
University education of head -136.3 -0.167*** -136.6 -32.07 -0.167*** 
 
-87.6 -0.0327 -87.45 -50.74 -0.0527 
Above university education of head 83.14 -0.0379 70.72 37.83 -0.0371 
 
-386.6 -0.151 -384.6 -142.6 -0.152 
Size of HH -106.6 0.0736* -98.14 -176 0.0602 
 
-168.2 -0.0422 -163.9 -129.1 -0.0749 
Size of HH, squared 13.33 0.00175 12.12 16.24 0.00296 
 
-17.27 -0.00444 -16.49 -15.48 -0.00566 
Dependency ratio 251.6 0.441*** 250.5 239.8* 0.454*** 
 
-180.1 -0.0917 -179.8 -142.2 -0.0885 
Main income from pension -129.2 -0.047 -119 -76.75 -0.0503 
 
-167.8 -0.0591 -167.2 -150.1 -0.0631 
Main income from social assistance -91.65 0.238 -81.94 -5.405 0.24 
 
-194.2 -0.156 -194.2 -195.4 -0.173 
Main income from other sources 235 -0.0973 246.6 304.6 -0.0823 
 
-526.6 -0.0941 -526.8 -517.5 -0.11 
No income 188.1 0.0418 194 78.93 0.0453 
 
-212.9 -0.0666 -213.1 -124.2 -0.11 
Own house 14.37 -0.0411 13.33 399.9*** -0.008 
 
-325.2 -0.0696 -324.9 -62.71 -0.311 
Albanian 169.2 0.0594 157.4 217.9*** 0.0742 
 
-108.8 -0.045 -109.7 -82.36 -0.0749 
Urban 149.8 0.0355 149 197.7*** 0.0492 
 
-99.84 -0.0356 -99.77 -74.13 -0.0611 
Capital 0.167 -0.0657* 7.773 102.9 -0.0594 
 
-114.5 -0.0357 -114.1 -83.73 -0.0776 
Male head of HH -223.1** 0.0163 -229.3** -157.2** 0.00814 
 
-101.7 -0.0447 -102 -75.94 -0.0621 
Dum2012 360.1*** 0.000973 333.7*** 579.4*** 0.0403 
 
-103.2 -0.0654 -105.2 -81.02 -0.22 
Remit 
 
-0.000272* 
  
-0.00026 
  
-0.00014 
  
-0.00074 
remit*dum2012 
    
-7.95E-05 
     
-0.00078 
dum_no_econ 425.2***
 
84.44 -36.93
 
 
-150 
 
-212.5 -44.74 
 dum_no_econ*dum2012 
  
606.0** 702.0*** 
 
   
-286.4 -193.4 
 Constant 985
 
969.4 -174.1 
 
 
-802.1 
 
-798.8 -408.1 
 Observations 1,690 1,690 1,690 1,690 1,690
F stat 4.4 
 
4.5 7.9 
 R-squared 0.03  0.031 0.095  
Dependent variables in italics. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Finally, remittances – the focus of this study – are found to affect poverty in a positive fashion, so that 
an additional thousand euro of remittance money, reduces the probability of being poor by 27% on 
average (at the mean of the explanatory variables). In other words, a household which has 1600 euros 
of remittances per year, is 27% less likely to be poor than a household which has 600 euros of 
remittances (the mean of the variable), on average, ceteris paribus. This is a very strong effect. 
The results of the crisis second-stage regression are shown in the last column of Table 11. Most of the 
coefficients are very similar to the baseline results. The main variable of interest here is the 
dum_no_econ*dum2012, which shows whether the effect of remitances on poverty differed in 2012, 
with respect to 2008. This variable is insignificant, pointing out that the relationship remained 
unchanged. 
 
5.2. Remittances and inequality 
We will measure welfare by consumption, not income, for two main reasons. The first one is 
that consumption is a better indicator for welfare, since utility in all economic models is 
represented by consumption, not income. The second one is a purely practical reason – 
people tend to under-report income much more than consumption, as a result of what around 
16% of our households report no income at all.  
As explained in section 4.1, the inequality analysis has several stages. The first one estimates 
the probability for not-receiving remittances. The second one estimates a consumption 
function for HHs without remittances (correcting for the selection bias, i.e. for the probability 
of not-receiving remittances). The third stage uses this function to simulate the consumption 
of remittances-receiving HHs. Finally, the Gini coefficient on this simulated consumption is 
compared to the actual Gini coefficient. 
The results of the first-stage regression, which explains the probability not to receive 
remittances (equation 3 from above) are shown in Table 12. Since the purpose of our analysis 
is not to investigate determinants of remittances, we will not interpret this regression in 
greater details. It is worth noting that most (if not all) of the coefficients appear with the 
expected signs and magnitudes, and that the variable which is supposed to be exogenous with 
respect to consumption, the share of household with remittances in the corresponding region, 
is significant and negative in the first-stage regression, pointing out that the probability not to 
receive remittances is negatively related to the share of remittance-receiving households in 
the region. 
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Table 12. – Results of the first-stage regression for the determinants of the consumption 
of households without remittances 
Dependent variable: Dummy taking value of 1 if household has no remittances 
Gender of the head (1 if male) 0.313*** 
Age of the head (years) 0.00498 
Age of the head, squared 7.96E-06 
Marriage status of head (1 if married) -0.227** 
Education of head (1 if with incomplete or complete 
secondary school) 
0.211* 
Education of head (1 if with college or university) 0.385** 
Education of head (1 if with postgraduate degrees) 0.122 
Size of household (no of members) 0.315*** 
Size of household squared -0.0238** 
Percentage of dependent members in total household 
members 
-0.049 
Main income (1 if pension is main income) -0.0901 
Main income (1 if social assistance is main income) 0.397 
Main income (1 if other source is main income) -0.285 
No income (1 if the household has no income) -0.0382 
Albanian (1 if Albanian) -0.342*** 
Own house (1 if the household possesses own house) -0.284* 
Self employment (1 if household has a private business) -0.0642 
Urban (1 if urban (except capital)) -0.270*** 
Capital (1 if capital (Skopje)) 0.0263 
2012 (1 for the year 2012 (during crisis)) 0.144 
Share of households with remittances in the region -3.383*** 
Constant 0.971** 
  
Observations 1,690 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The results of the second-stage regression (equation 2 from above), which gives the 
determinants of the consumption of households without remittances, are shown in Table 13. 
Again, since our main interest does not lie in the determinants of household consumption, we 
will not interpret these results thoroughly. It is only worth noting that the Inverse Mills ratio 
is insignificant in the regression, pointing out that there is no selection bias arising from 
investigating determinants of consumption on a sample of non-remittance receiving 
households. 
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Table 13. – Results of the second-stage regression for the determinants of the 
consumption of households without remittances 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of households consumption per capita 
Gender of the head (1 if male) -0.066 
Age of the head (years) 0.0014 
Age of the head, squared -2.58E-06 
Marriage status of head (1 if married) 0.0699 
Education of head (1 if with incomplete or complete 
secondary school) 
0.0421 
Education of head (1 if with college or university) 0.362*** 
Education of head (1 if with postgraduate degrees) 0.537* 
Size of household (no of members) -0.365*** 
Size of household squared 0.0224*** 
Percentage of dependent members in total household 
members 
-0.712*** 
Main income (1 if pension is main income) 0.00751 
Main income (1 if social assistance is main income) -0.259* 
Main income (1 if other source is main income) 0.519*** 
No income (1 if the household has no income) 0.00234 
Albanian (1 if Albanian) 0.0636 
Own house (1 if the household possesses own house) -0.151 
Self employment (1 if household has a private business) 0.209*** 
Urban (1 if urban (except capital)) -0.0431 
Capital (1 if capital (Skopje)) 0.118** 
2012 (1 for the year 2012 (during crisis)) 0.581*** 
Constant 8.082*** 
  
Inverse Mills ratio -0.183 
  
Observations 1,216 
R-squared 0.288 
  
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
These estimates are then used to predict the consumption that households which receive 
remittances would have had, in case they had not received remittances. However, a simple fit 
of this regression would provide very stable consumption, because it omits all the random 
factors that affect household consumption. To address this problem, we will follow Barham 
and Boucher (1998) and Acosta et al. (2008), and will add a series of consumption shocks to 
the fitted values of the above regression, the former being drawn from a normal dristribution 
with properties as the residuals from the above regression (zero mean and standard deviation 
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of 0.6598454)8. The series that is obtained in this way is then the consumption that 
households with remittances would have, had they not received remittances.  
The Gini coefficient is then calculated on this simulated consumption and on the actual 
consumption, both for 2008 and 2012. The calculated values are shown inTable 14. 
Table 14. – Gini coefficient for actual and simulated consumption 
 Gini coefficient 
Actual consumption Consumption without 
remittances 
2008 0.4599 0.4499 
2012 0.3524 0.3831 
   
Panel 0.4120 0.4263 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
Several things can be noted. First, inequality has decreased from 2008 to 2012 – the Gini 
coefficient for the actual consumption is lower in 2012 than in 2008. Next, for 2008, the Gini 
coefficient for the actual consumption is higher than that for the simulated consumption 
(consumption without remittances). That points out that remittances have been increasing 
consumption inequality in 2008, but only a little - the difference between the two figures is 
rather low. On the other hand, for 2012, the Gini coefficient for the actual consumption is 
lower than that for the simulated consumption. That points out that in this year remittances 
have been lowering inequality. Observed for the two periods at the same time, the Gini 
coefficient is lower for the actual series than for the simulated, suggesting that overall, 
remittances decrease inequality, but only marginally, since the difference in the two 
coefficients is low. However, the overall result could be rather the combined effect of the 
inequality increasing effect in 2008 and the opposite effect in 2012. Therefore, it is likely that 
economically meaningful effect is the one during the crisis, suggesting that remittances had 
an inequality reducing effect.  
 
6. Conclusion  
The objective of this paper is the shed new light on remittances in Macedonia, i.e. on the role they 
play for alleviation of poverty and inequality, particularly after the Global Recession. For that 
8 For replication of the results, the seed used for drawing from the distribution was set to 2601. 
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purpose, we used an existing survey of before the crisis and conducted new one on a representative 
sample of 1000 households in Macedonia in late-2012, i.e. during the crisis.  
The main conclusion of the analysis for remittances in Macedonia is that they reduce poverty, both 
before and after the crisis. The inequality analysis pointed out that remittances have been increasing 
inequality in 2008, but only a little, while they have decreased it sizeably in 2012.  
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